“To everyone else, the massacre took place 32 years ago, but for me, it just feels like it all happened yesterday. Almost my entire family was wiped out in front of my eyes, and even after so many years, we haven’t got any justice. The culprits are still roaming free. We are still fighting the consequences of what happened.”

     Bhagi Kaur, a victim of the November 1984 anti-Sikh genocide.¹

On the morning of October 31, 1984, Indian Prime Minister (PM) Indira Gandhi was walking through the garden of her official residence for an interview with actor and filmmaker Peter Ustinov when two of her bodyguards, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh, shot her. The PM was immediately rushed to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in Delhi. The news of the attempt on her life first appeared on the BBC at around 10 a.m.² By 11:00 a.m., All India Radio, controlled by the government, reported the incident. Evening editions of several papers in the capital carried news of the PM having succumbed to her injuries. By then, crowds had begun gathering at the AIIMS.³ In the afternoon, at around 1:00 p.m., the Hindustan Times announced the death of PM Gandhi. Doordarshan, the national television service, announced the assassination attempt at 6:10 p.m.⁴

The event marked a pivotal moment in modern-day India, triggering a wave of anti-Sikh violence across the country,⁵ particularly in Delhi, where thousands of Sikhs were killed in the days that followed in a well-organized genocidal campaign.

Beginning roughly 18 hours after the Hindustan Times and Indian Express first announced Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, the Congress (I) party and Indian police unleashed a nightmare of organized violence against the Sikh community, supported and encouraged by the Delhi and Central governments. Gangs of assailants burned Sikhs alive, gang-raped Sikh women, and destroyed their gurudwaras and properties, among other devastating crimes. The violence, allegedly motivated out of grief over Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, continued unabated for at least four days, and intermittently for the rest of the week.⁶

The carnage, according to official records, claimed 2,733 lives in Delhi alone, though human rights organizations place the number nearer to 4,000⁷. However, the independent estimates run much higher, varying from 5,000 to 20,000.^8,9,10 By 4 November, when there was some evidence of an abatement in the violence, there were already an estimated 50,000 people housed in temporary shelters.¹¹

Later, a written submission made to the Misra Commission (April 1985) on behalf of the Delhi Administration painted the massacre of Sikhs as a sudden and spontaneous national outburst. It indirectly blamed the Sikh community by insinuating that a simmering discontent and resentment against the Sikh community due to acts of commission and omission, overt and covert, led to the massacre of the Sikhs.¹²

However, as a report published by People’s Union for Civil Liberties & People’s Union for Democratic Rights states, “The attacks on the members of the Sikh community in Delhi... far from being spontaneous expressions of “madness” and of “grief and anger” at Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, as made out by the authorities, was the outcome of a well-organized plan marked by acts of both deliberate commission and omission by important politicians of the Congress and by authorities in the administration.”¹³

Even though the available evidence runs contrary to this argument, the fact that the systematic killing of Sikhs did not start until the next day—after Congress (I) party officials met with their local support networks—points to a different reality. Additionally, the fact that the mobs had voter lists, kerosene, other flammable chemical substances, and state infrastructure at their disposal paints a very different picture.¹⁴ Not to mention that the police played an active and systematic role in disarming Sikhs during this period.¹⁵ In this regard, details shared by Jaskaran Kaur, a human rights activist with ENSAAF, are chilling. In her report, she states that senior police officers:

1. ordered their subordinates to ignore attacks against Sikhs;
2. ordered policemen to disarm Sikhs to increase their vulnerability to attack;
3. systematically disabled and neutralized any officers who attempted to deviate from the norm of police inaction and instigation;
4. released culprits; and
5. manipulated police records in order to destroy any paper trail of the violence and protect criminals from the possibility of effective future prosecutions.

Another point to consider is that in ordinary, more spontaneous riots, the number of people injured is usually observed to be far higher than the number killed.¹⁶

Since the pogroms, the state persistently denied the organized and genocidal nature of the violence against the Sikhs. However, primarily driven by the political compulsion of the changing times and electoral considerations, the subsequent governments eventually acknowledged, at least verbally, that the violence constituted genocide.

After the BJP government came into power, at many junctures in the past decade, government functionaries have called and acknowledged violence against the Sikhs in 1984 a genocide.^17,18 However, this rhetoric only amounts to lip service, as the official position of the Government of India (GOI) remains unchanged. Despite the BJP leadership's public statements, the GOI has still not recognized the Sikh killings as a genocide.

To better understand this refusal, it is crucial first to explore what constitutes genocide and the motivations behind perpetrating it.

Genocide is a heinous crime against humanity that involves the intentional destruction of a particular group based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, or another defining characteristic. It often involves systematic violence, mass killings, forced displacement, and many other such atrocious acts.

As per Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”¹⁹

Governments often carry out large-scale genocidal massacres targeting racial, ethnic, religious, and political groups. The distinctions between these forms of violence are usually blurred, as political motives frequently play a significant role in genocides against racial, ethnic, or religious communities.

The political awareness at the root of Sikh consciousness has always been a thorn in the flesh for establishments of all time. From time to time, they have used extreme violence as a tool to bring Sikh consciousness to submission. The violence against the Sikh community in November 1984 was one such in the most recent times.²⁰

Genocides are more accessible to perpetrate if there are no repercussions or consequences. Most genocidal regimes are not accountable to the international community or are immune and, at home, find a complying or actively cheering or aiding populace for the condition for a genocide to evolve/arise.

In the so-called democracies with mechanisms to bring accountability, it does not work if the populace also supports such heinous acts. The Sikh genocide in June 1984 and then in November was easy to perpetrate on the back of a supercharged and communalized proletariat. This was clearly demonstrated by the results of the Lok Sabha (lower house) elections held in December 1984, just over a month after the Sikh genocide. “Despite only six weeks of campaigning – then the shortest in India’s history – on December 27, 1984, the Congress (I) party won 401 Lok Sabha seats out of 508 for the first time in Indian history. In South Delhi, Lalit Maken won 60 percent of the votes polled. HKL Bhagat, in whose East Delhi constituency the highest number of Sikhs were killed, won the second largest majority and was rewarded with a cabinet minister position again. Bhagat won 386,150 votes compared to the second highest count of 73,970 in his District. Jagdish Tytler won the Delhi Sadar district getting almost twice as many votes as M.L. Khurana, the senior BJP leader.”²¹

Although this violence is portrayed as a spontaneous outburst of anger, it was, in fact, well-organized, planned, and carefully orchestrated.

A fact-finding team jointly organized by the People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in the course of their investigations from November 1 to November 10 concluded that the attacks on members of the Sikh Community in Delhi and its suburbs during the period, far from being a spontaneous expression of "madness" and of popular "grief and anger" at Mrs. Gandhi's assassination as made out to be by the authorities, were the outcome of a well-organized plan marked by acts of both deliberate commissions and omissions by important politicians of the Congress (I) at the top and by authorities in the administration. Although there was the handiwork of a determined group which was inspired by different sentiments altogether.²²

Manoj Mitta, journalist and author, notes that “these were no riots, there are certainly good reasons to call these genocidal killings, clear signs of state-sponsored violence.”²³

Following the assassination of the Prime Minister on October 31, 1984, the carnage in Delhi and the other parts of the country, especially in the Congress-ruled states, was unprecedented both in its calculated manner and magnitude.²⁴ Some very prominent Congress leaders played a decisive role in planning, instigating and executing the heinous deeds of murder, loot, rape and arson. No doubt, there was shock and grief but the large-scale violence that followed was the handiwork of a determined group which was organised and inspired by altogether different motives.²⁵

This highly efficient killing machine was systematically supported, and even aided in some cases, by the police, which was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).²⁶

Jaskaran Kaur, in her investigation of the role of the police, states that the “police officers systematically and thoroughly manipulated or destroyed the potential opportunities for gathering evidence of the perpetrators and crimes. The police refused to record or manipulated information regarding attacks against Sikhs; performed casual investigations, if at all, precluding effective future prosecutions; and falsified their records to cover up the carnage and their lawless activities. Well aware of the future need to hide the criminality of their actions, the police records provide us with little information on the role of police officers and government officials in the carnage, as well as of the spectrum and extent of crimes perpetrated against Sikhs during the massacres.”²⁷

The Indian media's role in shaping public perception during this period cannot be understated. It played a significant part in fueling the already volatile atmosphere by framing the assassination in a communal context.

The role of the media also became a factor in inciting violence. It tried to project the assassination as that of a Hindu Prime Minister killed by two Sikh assassins. The Times of India chose to give the front page provocative headline: ‘Indira Gandhi shot dead: Sikh security men pump bullets in chest, abdomen.’ Again, The Times of India, in a front-page editorial on November 2, 1984, wrote: “India is ablaze with hate and anger. The situation is too grim to admit of evasion and euphemism. It would be dishonest to say that the hatred is directed only or even mainly against the Akalis, the secessionists and the extremists. The exercise would also be futile. In city after city from one corner of the country to the other enraged mobs have gone and are going about systematically burning and looting Sikh properties and assaulting Sikhs without discrimination. The people know the truth. They do not depend on newspapers to tell them the facts. It will be equally dishonest to say that only anti-social elements are encaged in these activities. These elements are doubtless active but others have also joined them. Those who shouted “blood for blood” on Thursday in front of Teen Murti House in New Delhi where Mrs Gandhi’s body lay in state were mostly educated people and not denizens of the underworld. The anger against the Sikh community is sweeping large sections of the Indian community.”²⁸

For many months after the anti-Sikh violence, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi refused to set up an inquiry commission. Jaskaran Kaur notes that “in the six months following the massacres, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi established at least four inquiry commissions on different issues, but refused demands for an inquiry commission into the November 1984 Sikh massacres. In February 1985, Gandhi claimed that by refusing to order an inquiry commission, he was “shielding the Sikh people themselves.” In March, he justified his refusal because a commission would “raise issues which are really dead.””²⁹

Since then, forty years have passed without any substantial remedy. In order to investigate crimes against the Sikhs so far four commissions, nine committees, and two Special Investigation Teams (SIT) have been set up so far, with little progress on actual conviction and punishment for the perpetrators of these crimes.

Here, I will briefly review the names, mandates, and outcomes of each commission, committee, and SIT established to investigate the anti-Sikh violence of November 1984. A review of their reports reveals how farcical these exercises have been, serving to obscure the truth, delay justice, and facilitate cover-ups rather than provide accountability.

Marwah Commission (November 1984)

The Marwah Commission was set up in November 1984 by the Delhi Administration under Mr. Ved Marwah, the Additional Commissioner of Police, who was assigned the job of enquiring into the role of police during the carnage. Marwah almost completed his inquiry in mid-1985 when the Central Government directed him to stop the inquiry. In its place, the Misra Commission was appointed to take over the investigation.

The explanation offered was that a judicial investigation, led by Supreme Court Justice Ranganath Misra, had been established that same month, and that it was tasked with examining the violence in its entirety.³⁰

Complete records of the Marwah Commission were taken over by the Government, but only selectively passed on to Misra Commission.³¹ The most important part of the record, namely the handwritten notes of Mr. Ved Marwah, which contained important information, was not transferred to the Misra Commission.

It was then stalled by the Central government and its records were selectively passed on to the next commission when the Misra Commission was set up. 

"A bench of justices S Muralidhar and Vinod Goel noted that at first, the Marwaha Committee, headed by Ved Marwaha, began recording statements of victims as well as police officers involved. The bench also said that even before the committee could complete the exercise, the Centre set up a one-man Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 comprising Justice Ranganath Misra. The statements recorded by the Marwaha Committee were to be handed over to and examined by the Justice Ranganath Misra Commission but for unexplained reasons, this was not done, the bench noted."³²

Misra Commission of Enquiry (April 1985)

Justice Ranganath Misra, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court of India who later became the Chief Justice of India, led a new commission formed in April 1985. The complete records of the Marwah Commission were transferred to this new commission, though Marwah’s handwritten notes were not included. Justice Misra submitted his report in August 1986, which was placed before the parliament in February 1987.³³ The Misra Commission stated that its only term of reference was to determine whether the violence had happened and not to identify any person or their role. However, it noted that a large number of cases, especially against politicians or police officers, had not been registered and highlighted the delay in the army’s response to the riots. Despite these observations, the report exonerated Rajiv Gandhi and senior Congress leader H.K.L. Bhagat and found no particular reason for police inaction.

It concluded that the violence following Indira Gandhi's assassination was a spontaneous reaction driven by widespread grief and shock among the population. It attributed the unrest primarily to the "lower classes" of society, arguing that their growing criminalization had played a significant role in fueling the violence. The report further claimed that if Congress (I) party workers were involved in the killings, they acted not as representatives of the party, but in their individual capacities. This absolved the Congress party of direct responsibility for the violence, shifting the focus to personal misconduct rather than organized political action.³⁴

The Misra Commission recommended the formation of three additional committees to look into the role of the police, the registration of cases, and the total number of killings. The case of the victims was presented before the Misra Commission by the Citizens Justice Committee, a body constituted for this specific purpose, comprising Justice S.M. Sikri, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India as its President, Justice V.M. Tarkunde, former Judge of the Bombay High Court, Mr. Soli Sorabjee, former Attorney General, Mr. Khushwant Singh, eminent journalist, Justice R.S. Narula, former Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana High Court, Lt. Gen. J.S. Arora, Prof. Rajni Kothari, President, PUCL, Mr. Govinda Mukhotey, President, PUDR and others. Mr. H.S. Phoolka, Advocate, was the Member Secretary of this Committee, who appeared before the commission and was also in charge of the affairs of the Committee.

Dhillon Committee (November 1985)

The Dhillon Committee, established in November 1985 and headed by veteran Congress leader Gurdial Singh Dhillon,³⁵ was tasked with recommending measures for the rehabilitation of the victims and their families in the aftermath of the 1984 anti-Sikh violence, which the committee conveniently labeled as “riots.” The committee submitted its report by the end of that year. One of its major recommendations was to ensure that business establishments with insurance coverage but whose claims were rejected on the technical grounds that riots were not covered under their insurance policies should be compensated under the direction of the GOI. The committee pointed out that since all insurance companies were nationalized, they should be mandated to pay these claims. This recommendation was aimed at addressing the injustice faced by those whose properties were damaged during the riots but were denied compensation by insurance companies.

However, the Government did not accept this recommendation, leading to the rejection of insurance claims by all insurance companies across the country. This decision left many business owners and victims without the desperately needed financial support. The committee also highlighted the inadequacy of the compensation amount, as a mere Rs 10,000 was mandated for the families of those who had lost their lives in the violence. The Dhillon Committee's critical recommendation that insurance money be paid to those whose property had been damaged, despite the technical exclusions in the insurance policies, underscored the need for governmental intervention in ensuring fair treatment of the victims. Nonetheless, the rejection of this recommendation by the Government meant that the intended relief was not provided, and the insurance companies were not compelled to compensate the victims.

Kapur Mittal Committee (February 1987)

Following the Misra Commission's recommendation, the Kapur Mittal Committee was established on 23 February 1987³⁶ to investigate the role of the police in the 1984 killings. This task had nearly been completed by the Marwah Committee in 1985 before the Government abruptly ordered it to halt its operations. The new committee, consisting of Justice Dalip Kapur and Mrs. Kusum Mittal, a retired Secretary of U.P., was appointed almost two years later to continue this investigation.

In February 1990, the committee members submitted separate reports due to a different opinion. Mrs. Mittal focused solely on available records, while Justice Kapur sought to incorporate oral testimonies and off-the-record accounts.

Justice Kapur identified 72 police officers for gross negligence and conspiracy, recommending the dismissal of 30 of them. However, the Home Ministry chose to accept Mittal’s report, and no officers were dismissed. As a result, these officers remained in service and advanced in their careers later.

Jain Banerjee Committee (February 1987)

The Jain Banerjee Committee, established in February 1987 on the recommendation of the Misra Commission, was tasked with recommending the registration of cases. This committee was composed of Justice M.L. Jain, a former judge of the Delhi High Court, and Mr. A.K. Banerjee, a retired Inspector General of Police. The Misra Commission's report highlighted that a significant number of cases had not been registered, particularly those where victims named political leaders or police officers. The committee recommended the registration of cases against Congress leaders Mr. Sajjan Kumar and Mr. Brahmanand Gupta in August 1987. However, no case was registered. Instead, in November 1987, numerous press reports surfaced criticizing the failure to register cases despite the committee's recommendations.

Subsequently, In December 1987, Mr. Brahmanand Gupta filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court and obtained a stay against the committee's actions. The Government did not oppose this stay. The Citizens Justice Committee, an organization dedicated to advocating for the victims of the 1984 riots, filed an application to vacate the stay. Ultimately, in October 1989, the Delhi High Court quashed the appointment of the Jain Banerjee Committee,³⁷ citing a conflict between the Delhi Police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure as the basis for their decision. An appeal against this decision was subsequently filed by the Citizens Justice Committee in the Supreme Court.

Despite the Misra Commission's findings and the subsequent recommendations by the Jain Banerjee Committee to register numerous cases that had previously been ignored, particularly those involving political figures and police officers, the efforts were blocked. Gupta's writ petition, which led to a stay on the committee’s report, was not contested by the Government, further complicating the matter. The High Court's decision to quash the committee's appointment due to procedural conflicts left many cases unregistered and unresolved. This outcome prompted the Citizens Justice Committee to appeal to the Supreme Court to overturn the High Court's ruling and reinstate the committee's mandate to ensure justice for the victims.

Ahooja Committee (February 1987)

The Ahooja Committee, established in 1987, was the third committee recommended by the Misra Commission. Its primary task was to ascertain the total number of killings in Delhi during the November 1984 anti-Sikh violence.

The committee submitted its report in August 1987. According to the report of the committee, 2,733 Sikhs were killed in Delhi alone.³⁸ Additionally, the report indicated that a total of 3,325 killings took place across India.

Poti-Rosha Committee (March 1990)

The Poti-Rosha Committee, appointed in March 1990, was a successor to the Jain Banerjee Committee. It was composed of retired Gujarat High Court Chief Justice P. Subramanian Poti and retired IPS officer P.A. Rosha. The committee was established to continue investigating and recommending the registration of cases, particularly against those implicated in the 1984 riots. It also recommended the registration of cases against Sajjan Kumar. However, the Poti Rosha Committee functioned for a relatively short period before its term expired in September 1990, which was not renewed.³⁹

Jain-Aggarwal Committee (November 1990)

The Jain-Aggarwal Committee, established in November 1990, succeeded the Poti-Rosha Committee. It was composed of Justice J.D. Jain, a retired judge of the Delhi High Court, and Mr. D.K. Aggarwal, a retired Director General of Police from Uttar Pradesh.

The committee re-examined the 669 affidavits previously filed during Justice Misra’s tenure, adding 415 new affidavits and reviewing 403 FIRs recorded by the Delhi Police.

In its report, submitted on 30 June 1993,⁴⁰ the committee recommended the registration of cases against prominent Congress leaders HKL Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar, Dharamdas Shastri, and Jagdish Tytler. Despite its findings that police investigations had been cursory, no cases were filed. The committee even considered appointing special prosecutors to examine the cases. Nonetheless, the police did not register any cases, and the committee was ultimately wound up in August 1993.

The lack of action following the Ahuja Committee's recommendations highlighted a systemic failure in addressing the violence, despite clear evidence and proposals for further scrutiny.

Jain-Aggarwal Committee, which, in its report of 1992, had recommended further investigations into the cases concerning the attack on the house of Jasbir Singh, whose house was looted, and the incident involving the deaths of the five members of a Sikh family - Kehar Singh, Gurpreet Singh, Raghuvender Singh, Narender Pal Singh, and Kuldeep Singh. A supplementary charge sheet was filed on February 26, 1993, in the case relating to the attack on Jasbir Singh's house, against four accused, however, it also ended in their acquittal by a judgment dated April 30, 1994.⁴¹

Narula Committee (December 1993)

The Narula Committee was appointed in December 1993 by the BJP Chief Minister Madan Lal Khurana. This committee was led by Ranjit Singh Narula, the retired Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

In its report, submitted in January 1994,⁴² the committee recommended the registration of cases against prominent Congress leaders HKL Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar, and Jagdish Tytler. 

Despite the Narula Committee's recommendations, no cases were registered against the Congress leaders HKL Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar, and Jagdish Tytler. The recommendations, like many others, did not translate into concrete legal action or prosecutions.

Nanavati Commission (May 2000)

After the cases against the culprits of anti-Sikh violence did not make much progress, the Nanavati Commission was established by a unanimous resolution passed in the Rajya Sabha. Headed by Justice G.T. Nanavati, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of India, the commission was tasked with investigating the events and accountability related to the violence.⁴³

The commission issued notices to several prominent figures, including HKL Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar and Dharamdas Shastri, Kamal Nath, and Jagdish Tytler.

The commission’s report was due to be submitted in November 2004.⁴⁴ However, it was eventually submitted in May 2005. Its findings underscored the organized nature of the attacks on Sikhs, noting the systematic manner in which they were killed.

The report highlighted that many affidavits indicated local Congress leaders and workers had incited or aided the mobs. Additionally, it pointed out that the police had, in many instances, confiscated the arms and other means by which the Sikhs could have defended themselves.

However, the commission dismissed allegations of complicity against Rajiv Gandhi, stating the allegations could never be confirmed, and recommended the reopening of only four cases closed by the police.

The cases of the victims were presented before the commission by the Carnage Justice Committee, a body specifically founded for this purpose. This committee comprised Mr. Kuldip Nayar, serving as its President, Justice Rajinder Sachhar; former Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, Prof. Rajni Kothari; the late Justice V.M. Tarkunde, Justice R.S. Narula; former Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana, Justice Jaspal Singh, former Judge of the Delhi High Court, Prof. N.S. Bawa, a Professor of Law at Delhi University, and Mr. H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate. Wg. Cdr. R.S. Chhatwal served as the Member Secretary of this committee.

The Nanavati Commission believed there was credible material against Sajjan Kumar and Balwan Khokhar, a former Congress councilor. It also stated that the recommendation of the Commission was to take further action after examining cases where the witnesses have accused Kumar specifically, and yet no charge sheets were filed against him, and those cases which were terminated as untraced.⁴⁵

It is worth noting that of the 587 FIRs registered as per the Nanavati Commission, only 27 of the cases have so far resulted in conviction, whereas 240 cases were closed as "untraced" and another 250 resulted in acquittal.⁴⁶

Mathur Committee (December 2014)

The Mathur Committee, established in December 2014 and led by retired Supreme Court judge G.P. Mathur⁴⁷ was formed “to look into the grievances related to 1984 riot on the following terms of reference: need for constitution of SIT for investigating the cases of 1984 Riots; to look into the grievances related to 1984 riots; to oversee the implementation of the payment of additional enhanced compensation; and, to ascertain the requirement of any other assistance for 1984 riot victims.”⁴⁸

The primary purpose of the Mathur Committee was to review the existing reports and recommendations regarding the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, particularly those from the Nanavati Commission, the Misra Commission, and other inquiries. The committee aimed to assess the adequacy of the action taken based on these reports.

The committee submitted its report in January 2015⁴⁹ and determined that the investigations into the offenses were inadequate, characterizing the efforts as a sham. As a result, it recommended the creation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to review closed cases.

Central Government Special Investigation Team (February 2015)

In February 2015, the central government implemented the Mathur Committee's recommendation and constituted a three member Special Investigation Team (SIT) for investigating/re-investigating the cases of 1984 and filing charge sheets against the accused where sufficient evidence is found.⁵⁰

This eventually led to the conviction of Naresh Sherawat and Yashpal Singh. The committee alleged that these two individuals had colluded with then councilor Jaipal Singh, although Jaipal Singh had been previously acquitted and was not re-examined. 

However, on 6 December 2017, the Special Investigation Team (SIT) closed 186 cases without conducting investigations. Subsequently, the Supreme Court intervened and decided to establish its own SIT during a hearing on 10 January 2018.

Supreme Court Special Investigation Team (January 2018)

On January 10, 2018, a bench led by Dipak Misra, the then Chief Justice of India, directed the establishment of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Supreme Court to scrutinize 186 cases previously closed by the Central Government SIT.

The directive highlighted the gravity of these cases and recommended the formation of a new SIT to continue further investigation. The Bench also observed that “the supervisory body, appointed by it, has found that out of 241 cases, 186 cases were closed without investigation.”⁵¹

Former Delhi High Court judge S.N. Dhingra was appointed as the chairperson of this three-member SIT, alongside Abhishek Dular, an IPS officer from the 2006 batch, and Rajdeep Singh, a retired IPS officer. Subsequently, one member of the SIT, retired Indian Police Service officer (IPS) Rajdeep Singh declined to be part of the team. The court had then given permission to the SIT to function with two members, Justice Dhingra and IPS officer Abhishek Dular.⁵² The committee was tasked with submitting a report within two months. However, after much delay it was submitted on 15 January 2020.⁵³

The report indicated that records for several cases could not be retrieved for examination because they had been “weeded out.” It also highlighted its inability to conduct further investigations due to the significant time that had elapsed, compounded by the inadequate work of the police. Key issues included the lack of effort by police to identify unclaimed bodies, the abuse of power by police officials, the failure to identify the rioters, significant delays in the judicial process, and due process of law not being followed.⁵⁴

In light of the above findings, the persistent failure of numerous commissions and inquiry committees over the past forty years to deliver justice for the victims of the 1984 anti-Sikh genocide underscores a systemic subversion of justice. Despite their formation and findings, the entire system seems to have been implemented to obscure the truth, delay accountability, and protect those responsible rather than bring them to justice.

The lack of political will has played a significant role in undermining these efforts. The few convictions一mentioned in the article above一that have took place have been overshadowed by the broader reality that many perpetrators, including prominent political figures, have evaded accountability and roam free. 

This recurring pattern of impunity reflects the challenges of securing justice in a system where political power often overshadows the rule of law and works against the victims of violence.

This is most evident in the high-profile cases of senior members of the Congress Party who held political offices for much of the past, even while facing ongoing court cases. Despite the legal proceedings against them, the Congress Party continued to install them in positions of power.

The only notable high-profile figure who faced the consequences was Sajjan Kumar, who was a member of parliament (MP) at the time of November 1984. In December 2018, he was convicted of inciting crowds to kill Sikhs as part of a ‘criminal conspiracy.'⁵⁵ In a scathing verdict, the Delhi high court judges said the accused evaded justice due to ‘political patronage.’⁵⁶

Manoj Mitta, journalist and author, notes that “the first case that was registered against Sajjan Kumar was in 1990. That six-year delay in itself points to the attempted cover-up, the complicity of the government of the day in blocking the process of justice.”⁵⁷

Jaskaran Kaur adds that “efforts to hold the organizers of the carnage accountable through the judicial system failed, primarily because of the initial destruction of evidence by the police, subsequent harassment of potential witnesses, and government and political interference in the initiation of cases. The eight main governmental commissions and committees inquiring into the massacres also failed to hold accountable the organizers of the massacres, by their own initiative or because of pressure by Congress (I) party officials and governments. Thus, 20 years later, no senior politician or police officer has faced conviction or official governmental condemnation for his role in the massacres.⁵⁸

Two prominent figures who long evaded prosecution were H.K.L. Bhagat and Jagdish Tytler. Bhagat, a former Union Minister and senior Congress leader was repeatedly accused of inciting violence against Sikhs, as documented by several commission reports. However, he was never convicted. Legal proceedings against him stalled due to his deteriorating health, and he passed away in 2005 without facing consequences for his actions.

Jagdish Tytler, a senior Congress leader and former Union Minister, was accused of involvement in the violence. Despite being named in numerous witness testimonies, legal cases against him have faced repeated delays, and he is yet to be convicted. Several investigations were reopened over the years, but no conviction has been secured. In fact, Tytler recently petitioned the Delhi High Court to quash a trial court's order framing charges against him in connection with the deaths of three men when a mob set fire to Pul Bangash Gurdwara in north Delhi.⁵⁹

A well-known legal maxim states, 'Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done.' This underscores the importance of transparency in the judicial process, ensuring that justice not only occurs but is also perceived as such by the public.

A telling example of the very lack and failure of judicial accountability on both counts is the statement made by Manmohan Singh, a Sikh Prime Minister who, ironically, represented the same Congress party that was responsible for anti-Sikh violence and also spoke on behalf of the Indian government. When the Justice G.T. Nanavati Commission's inquiry report was made public in 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh admitted in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament: “Twenty-one years have passed... and yet the feeling persists that somehow the truth has not come out.”⁶⁰

Now, forty years have passed since the events of November 1984, and still, the victims of this genocidal campaign seek closure. Countries like Chile, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, South Africa, and Ethiopia have taken steps to address atrocities committed decades ago. India, in refusing to confront its bloody recent history, stands in glaring contrast to these nations. What is preventing the world's largest democracy from rectifying the injustices of the past?

References

¹   Amnesty International India, Chauraasi Ki Nainsaafi - The Continued Injustice for the 1984 Sikh Massacre (Bengaluru: Amnesty International India 2017), 2.

²   Citizens' Commission, Delhi 31 October to 4 November 1984 - Report Of The Citizens' Commission (Delhi: Citizens' Commission, 1985), 12-13.

³   Citizens' Commission, Delhi 31 October to 4 November 1984 - Report Of The Citizens' Commission (Delhi: Citizens' Commission, 1985), 12-13.

⁴   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006) 4.

⁵   Jarnail Singh and Khushwant Singh, I Accuse...The Anti-Sikh Violence of 1984 (India: Penguin Books, 2011).

⁶   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006) 4.

⁷   https://theprint.in/india/governance/4-commissions-9-committees-2-sits-the-long-road-to-justice-for-1984-sikh-killings/150166/

⁸   Pav Singh, 1984 India’s Guilty Secret (London: Kashi House, 2017).

⁹   Joseph Paul, The Sage Encyclopedia Of War: Social Science Perspectives (SAGE publications, 2017), 433.

¹⁰   Inderjit Singh Jaijee, Politics of genocide: Punjab, 1984-1998 (Ajanta Publications, 1999), 114.

¹¹   Citizens' Commission, Delhi 31 October to 4 November 1984 - Report Of The Citizens' Commission (Delhi: Citizens' Commission, 1985), 35.

¹²   Justice Ranganath Misra, Report Of Justice Ranganath Misra Commission Of Inquiry (1985), 11.

https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/RanganathMishraVol_I_22102019_0.PDF

¹³   People’s Union for Civil Liberties & People’s Union for Democratic Rights, Report of the Joint Inquiry, Who Are The Guilty? (New Delhi: P.U.D.R. 1984), 1.

¹⁴   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 109.

¹⁵   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 45.

¹⁶   Patwant Singh, Harji Malik, Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation (Patwant Singh, 1985), 175.

¹⁷   http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/69276065.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

¹⁸   https://thewire.in/diplomacy/rajnath-called-1984-killings-genocide-now-mea-objects-canada

¹⁹   https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition

²⁰   https://sikhri.org/articles/the-attack-on-political-sikhi

²¹   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 80.

²²   People’s Union for Civil Liberties & People’s Union for Democratic Rights, Report of the Joint Inquiry, Who Are The Guilty? (New Delhi: P.U.D.R. 1984) 1.

²³   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/17/indian-court-convicts-sajjan-kumar-over-1984-anti-sikh-riots

²⁴   Gurdarshan Singh Dhillon, India Commits Suicide, Chapter 7 - The Massacre of Sikhs (Singh & Singh Publisher, 1992), 156.

²⁵   Gurdarshan Singh Dhillon, India Commits Suicide, Chapter 7 - The Massacre of Sikhs (Singh & Singh Publisher, 1992), 156.

²⁶   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 45.

²⁷   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 51.

²⁸   Gurdarshan Singh Dhillon, India Commits Suicide, Chapter 7 - The Massacre of Sikhs (Singh & Singh Publisher, 1993), 156.

²⁹   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 81.

³⁰   https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/29/india-no-justice-1984-anti-sikh-bloodshed

³¹   https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/anti-sikh-pogrom-october-31-november-4-1984-new-delhi.html

³²   https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/several-committees-were-set-up-to-inquire-into-1984-anti-sikh-riots-hc-118121701118_1.html

³³   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

³⁴   https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/anti-sikh-pogrom-october-31-november-4-1984-new-delhi.html

³⁵   https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/anti-sikh-pogrom-october-31-november-4-1984-new-delhi.html

³⁶   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

³⁷   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

³⁸   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

³⁹   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

⁴⁰   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

⁴¹   https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/several-committees-were-set-up-to-inquire-into-1984-anti-sikh-riots-hc-118121701118_1.html

⁴²   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

⁴³   https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2022-08/Nanavati-I_eng_3%5B1%5D.pdf

⁴⁴   Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 94.

⁴⁵   https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/several-committees-were-set-up-to-inquire-into-1984-anti-sikh-riots-hc-118121701118_1.html

⁴⁶   https://www.deccanherald.com/india/delhi/1984-anti-sikh-riots-forty-years-on-major-highlights-and-where-cases-stand-3255473

⁴⁷   https://ruralindiaonline.org/en/library/resource/report-on-need-for-constitution-of-sit-for-investigating-the-cases-of-1984-riots/

⁴⁸    https://www.indembsofia.gov.in/docs/1545215249Brief%20for%201984%20Sikh%20riots.pdf

⁴⁹    https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/234/Au1001.docx?source=pqars

⁵⁰    https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/234/Au1001.docx?source=pqars

⁵¹     https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/supreme-court-finds-186-anti-sikh-riots-cases-were-closed-without-investigation-1131761-2018-01-11

⁵²    https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi-news/sit-concludes-probe-of-1984-anti-sikh-riots/story-bVeOt5W36N3a0L2TQXGCPK.html

⁵³    https://www.barandbench.com/news/lack-of-interest-shown-by-police-in-handling-cases-justice-dhingra-committee-report-on-1984-riots

⁵⁴    https://www.barandbench.com/news/lack-of-interest-shown-by-police-in-handling-cases-justice-dhingra-committee-report-on-1984-riots

⁵⁵    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/17/indian-court-convicts-sajjan-kumar-over-1984-anti-sikh-riots

⁵⁶    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-46589391

⁵⁷    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/17/indian-court-convicts-sajjan-kumar-over-1984-anti-sikh-riots

⁵⁸    Jaskaran Kaur, Twenty Years of Impunity - The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India (Portland: Ensaaf, 2006), 81.

⁵⁹    https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/congress-leader-jagdish-tytler-seeks-quashing-of-charges-pleads-alibi-in-1984-anti-sikh-riots-case-9597871/

⁶⁰    Manoj Mitta, HS Phoolka, When a tree shook Delhi: The 1984 Carnage and Its Aftermath (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2008), preface.

⁶¹    Barbara Crossette, India’s Sikhs: Waiting for Justice (World Policy Journal 21, 2004), 70-77.